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AliExpress Caught Using Covert Inaudible Sound Fingerprinting for User Tracking

Global e-commerce giant AliExpress has been exposed for employing an intrusive and outdated browser fingerprinting technique that uses inaudible sound signals to track users across the web, raising significant privacy concerns.

By TECH NEWS Editorial·Source:Ars Technica·5 min read·1h ago

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AliExpress Caught Using Covert Inaudible Sound Fingerprinting for User Tracking

AliExpress, the global e-commerce giant, has been definitively caught employing a deeply intrusive and ostensibly outdated browser fingerprinting technique, surreptitiously utilizing inaudible sounds to track its users across the web. This revelation, detailed by security researchers, exposes a practice where the e-tailer's web properties transmitted ultrasonic audio signals, imperceptible to the human ear, to visitors' browsers. These unique sound patterns, processed by the browser's audio stack, generated a distinct "fingerprint" that could then be used to identify and track individual users, even across different sessions or when they attempted to clear cookies or use privacy-focused browser settings. The issue only came to light after a developer noticed their multipoint Bluetooth headphones would not switch properly from a computer to a phone while an AliExpress tab was open; closing the tab immediately resolved the problem. Investigation into the site's code revealed the use of the Web Audio API to build audio-processing graphs set to zero volume, connecting to the computer's audio system and keeping the audio path active in the background without audible sound. This technique, while not entirely novel in the annals of digital surveillance, underscores a persistent and aggressive push by advertisers and platforms to circumvent user privacy controls, raising significant alarm bells for consumer advocates and regulatory bodies alike.

The implications for users are profound, eroding the fundamental expectation of privacy online. While many users are aware of cookie-based tracking, and increasingly, more sophisticated canvas or WebGL fingerprinting, the use of inaudible audio adds another layer of covert surveillance that is particularly difficult to detect or mitigate without specialized tools. This method essentially turns a user's device into a passive beacon, broadcasting a unique identifier based on its specific audio hardware and software configuration. For the average user, this means that every visit to an AliExpress-affiliated site could contribute to a persistent profile, enabling highly granular tracking of browsing habits, purchasing intent, and potentially even real-world locations if combined with other data points. The "creepiness" factor is undeniable; it feels like an invasion, a digital eavesdropping that bypasses explicit consent and common privacy safeguards. This aggressive data collection strategy feeds into the broader surveillance economy, where personal information is the currency, and user autonomy is increasingly compromised.

From an industry perspective, AliExpress's deployment of such a technique is both baffling and concerning. Browser fingerprinting has evolved significantly over the past decade. Early methods often relied on easily detectable attributes like browser user-agent strings or IP addresses. More advanced techniques, such as canvas fingerprinting (which measures how a browser renders specific graphics) or WebGL fingerprinting, emerged as more resilient alternatives, creating unique identifiers based on subtle variations in rendering engines and hardware. However, even these methods have seen increasing countermeasures from browser developers. Modern browsers like Firefox and Brave have implemented robust anti-fingerprinting protections, often by randomizing or obfuscating the very attributes that fingerprinting scripts attempt to read, or by actively blocking known fingerprinting domains. For instance, Firefox 145, rolled out in 2025, introduced "Phase 2" protections that restrict websites' ability to collect unique device and browser characteristics, even standardizing certain outputs like CPU core counts to limit fingerprinting effectiveness. Apple's Safari, with its Intelligent Tracking Prevention (ITP), has also made significant strides in limiting cross-site tracking by restricting cookies and other website data, often using machine learning to identify and prevent tracking domains. Brave browser has included default protections against audio fingerprinting for over six years, altering browser outputs to provide inconsistent fingerprinting signals.

The use of inaudible sounds, while ingenious in its exploitation of a less-guarded vector, feels like a throwback. Security researchers have documented similar audio-based tracking attempts years ago, suggesting that the technique is not cutting-edge but rather a resurrected or persistent tactic targeting potential blind spots in browser defenses. The Web Audio API specification itself notes that properties like `sampleRate` and rendering behavior "can be used for fingerprinting". In an era where privacy regulations like GDPR and CCPA are increasingly enforced, and major tech companies are at least publicly committing to enhanced privacy features, AliExpress's actions appear to be a defiant outlier. This could potentially invite regulatory scrutiny and significant fines, particularly given the global reach of the platform and the sensitive nature of the data it collects. The Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) in the UK, for example, has clearly stated that "fingerprinting is not a fair means of tracking users online because it is likely to reduce people's choice and control over how their information is collected". The move also risks alienating a user base that is increasingly privacy-aware and more likely to gravitate towards platforms perceived as respecting their digital rights.

Looking ahead, the AliExpress incident serves as a stark reminder that the arms race between privacy advocates and tracking entities is far from over. While browser developers continue to fortify their defenses against known fingerprinting vectors, companies determined to track users will invariably seek out new, obscure, or previously abandoned methods. We can anticipate an acceleration in the development of "zero-trust" browser architectures that assume all scripts are potentially malicious and require explicit permission for access to sensitive device features, including audio hardware. Furthermore, the regulatory landscape is likely to intensify, with more stringent penalties for companies found to be in violation of user privacy laws, especially those employing covert and non-consensual tracking methods. The long-term trend, however, favors the user. As privacy becomes a more central differentiator for tech products and services, the economic incentives will shift towards respecting user data. Companies like AliExpress, caught engaging in such practices, may find their brand reputation and market share significantly impacted in an increasingly privacy-conscious global marketplace. The message from the industry and regulators is clear: the era of unchecked, covert digital surveillance is drawing to a close, and those who cling to outdated, invasive tactics do so at their own peril.